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has been modified in transit represents clear evidence of
tampering, a missing packet is inherently ambiguous: it
may have been explicitly blocked by a compromised
router or it may have been dropped benignly due to
network congestion. In fact, modern routers routinely
drop packets due to bursts in traffic that exceed their
buffering capacities, and the widely used Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) is designed to cause such losses
as part of its normal congestion control behavior. Thus,
existing traffic validation systems must inevitably
produce false positives for benign events and/or
produce false negatives by failing to report real
malicious packet dropping.

Abstract— TCP has provided the primary means to transfer data
reliably across the Internet, however TCP has imposed limitations
on several applications. Measurement and estimation of packet loss
characteristics are challenging due to the relatively rare occurrence
and typically short duration of packet loss episodes. While active
probe tools are commonly used to measure packet loss on end-toend paths, there has been little analysis of the accuracy of these
tools or their impact on the network. The main objective is to
understand the problem of detecting whether a compromised router
is maliciously manipulating its stream of packets. In particular to
this concern a simple yet effective attack in which a router
selectively drops packets destined for some Victim. Unfortunately, it
is quite challenging to attribute a missing packet to a malicious
action because normal network congestion can produce the same
effect. Modern networks routinely drop packets when the load
temporarily exceeds their buffering capacities. Previous detection
protocols have tried to address this problem with a user-definedthreshold: too many dropped packets imply malicious intent.
However, this heuristic is fundamentally unsound; setting this
threshold is, at best, an art and will certainly create unnecessary
false positives or mask highly focused attacks.

2 BACKGROUND
There are inherently two threats posed by a
compromised router. The attacker may subvert the
network control plane (e.g., by manipulating the routing
protocol into false route updates) or may subvert the
network data plane and forward individual packets
incorrectly. The first set of attacks have seen the widest
interest and the most activity—largely due to their
catastrophic potential. By violating the routing protocol
itself, an attacker may cause large portions of the
network to become inoperable.
While groundbreaking, Perlman’s work required
significant commitments of router resources and high
levels of network participation to detect anomalies.
However, we also assumed that the problem of
congestion ambiguity could be solved, without
providing a solution. This paper presents a protocol that
removes this assumption.

Index Terms—Internet dependability, intrusion detection and
tolerance, distributed systems, reliable networks, malicious routers.

1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet is not a safe place. Unsecured hosts can
expect to be compromised within minutes of connecting
to the Internet and even well-protected hosts may be
crippled with denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
In this paper, we develop a compromised router
detection protocol (CRDP) that dynamically infers the
precise number of congestive packet losses that will
occur. Once the congestion ambiguity is removed,
subsequent packet losses can be safely attributed to
malicious actions. We believe our protocol is the first to
automatically predict congestion in a systematic manner
and that it is necessary for making any such network
fault detection practical. Once a router has been
compromised in such a fashion, an attacker may
interpose on the traffic stream and manipulate it
maliciously to attack others—selectively dropping,
modifying, or rerouting packets.

3 INFERRING CONGESTIVE LOSS
In building a traffic validation protocol, it is necessary
to explicitly resolve the ambiguity around packet losses.
Should the absence of a given packet be seen as
malicious or benign? In practice, there are some
approaches for addressing this issue:
• Static Threshold: Low rates of packet loss are
assumed to be congestive, while rates above some
predefined threshold are deemed malicious.
• Traffic measurement. Individual packet losses are
predicted as a function of measured traffic load and

Several researchers have developed distributed
protocols to detect such traffic manipulations, typically
by validating that traffic transmitted by one router is
received unmodified by another [3], [4]. However, all
of these schemes—including our own—struggle in
interpreting the absence of traffic. While a packet that
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assume the administrative ability to assign and
distribute cryptographic keys to sets of nearby routers.

router buffer capacity. Deviations from these
predictions are deemed malicious.
Instead of using a static threshold, if the probability
of congestive losses can be modeled, then one could
resolve ambiguities by comparing measured loss rates
to the rates predicted by the model. A simplified
stochastic model of TCP congestion control yields the
following famous square root formula:

4.2 Threat Model
As explained in Section 1, this paper focuses solely on
data plane attacks (control plane attacks can be
addressed by other protocols the protocol we develop
validates traffic whose source and sink routers are
uncompromised.

Where B is the throughput of the connection, RTT is
the average round trip time, b is the number of packets
that are acknowledged by one ACK, and p is the
probability that a TCP packet is lost. The steady-state
throughput of long-lived TCP flows can be described
by this formula as a
function of RTT and p.
A protocol faulty router can send control messages with
arbitrarily faulty information, or it can simply not send
some or all of them. A faulty router is one that is traffic
faulty, protocol faulty, or both.
Attackers can
compromise one or more routers in a network.
However, for simplicity, we assume in this paper that
adjacent routers cannot be faulty. Our work is easily
extended to the case of k adjacent faulty routers.
Misdetection of legitimate behavior by TV results in a
false positive.

4 SYSTEM MODEL
Our work proceeds from an informed, yet abstracted,
model of how the network is constructed, the
capabilities of the attacker, and the complexities of the
traffic validation problem. In this section, we briefly
describe the assumptions underlying our model. We use
the same system model as in our earlier work [4].
4.1 Network Model
We consider a network to consist of individual
homogeneous routers interconnected via directional
point-to point links. This model is an intentional
simplification of real networks (e.g., it does not include
broadcast channels or independently failing network
interfaces) but is sufficiently general to encompass such
details if necessary.
Within a network, we presume that packets are
forwarded in a hop-by-hop fashion, based on a local
forwarding table This is critical, as we depend on the
routing protocol to provide each node with a global
view of the current network topology. Finally, we

•

Showing that χ is accurate and complete
assuming that TV is correct.
We discuss traffic validation in Section 6.2.

5 ANALYSIS OF PROTOCOL
In this section, we consider the properties and overhead
of protocol χ.

Traffic Validation Correctness
Any failure of detecting malicious attack by TV results
in a false negative, and any

There are two steps in showing the accuracy and
completeness of χ:
• Showing that TV is correct.

International Journal Communication & Network Security (IJCNS), Volume-I, Issue-II, 2011

61

Dynamic Detection of Packet Losses by CRDP

several different traffic-handling techniques, such as
traffic shaping,
traffic policing, packet filtering, and packet
classification. Given the configuration files, our work
can be extended to handle these fairly complex real-life
functions, even those involving nondeterminism, if the
expected
behavior of the function can be modeled.

Within the given system model of Section 4, the
example TV predicate in Section 5.1 is correct.
However, the system model is still simplistic. In a real
router, packets may be legitimately dropped due to
reasons other than congestion: for example, errors in
hardware, software or memory, and transient link
errors.

7.2 Adjacent Faulty Routers
We assume that there exists no adjacent faulty routers
in our threat model for simplicity. This assumption
eliminates consorting faulty routers that collude
together to produce fraudulent traffic information in
order to hide their faulty behavior. This is the same
approach that we used in [4], and it increases the
overhead of detection.
Fig:3 Simple topology

6 EXPERIENCES
We have implemented and experimented with protocol
χ in the Emulab [35], [36] testbed. In our experiments,
we used the simple topology shown in Fig. 3. The
routers were Dell PowerEdge 2850 PC nodes with a
single 3.0-GHz 64-bit Xeon processor and 2 Gbytes of
RAM, and they were running Redhat-Linux-9.0 OS
software. Each router except for r1 was connected to
three LANs to which user machines were connected.
The links between routers were configured with 3Mbps bandwidth, 20-ms delay, and 75,000-byte
capacity FIFO queue.
Each pair of routers shares secret keys; furthermore,
integrity and authenticity against the message
tampering is provided by message authentication codes.
In the second experiment, we first ran a training run to
measure the mean and standard deviation of qerror. We
found µ=0 and σ =1,750. We then ran protocol χ under
a high traffic load for more than 1 h, which generated
more than half a million packets. Approximately 4,000
validation rounds occurred within this run, and
approximately 16,000 packets were dropped due to
congestion distribution, and the lower false positive rate
for the combined packet drop test is because the test is
not done on a simple random sample. We are
investigating this further. In all of the subsequent
experiments, we used the same mean, standard
deviation, and two significance levels given here.

Fig. 4. Attack 5: Target a host trying to open a connection by
dropping SYN packets. (a) Average queue length. (b) Statistical test
results.

This assumption is necessary, in order to protect
against faulty terminal routers that drop packets they
receive from an end host or packets they should deliver
to an end host. However, it also excludes DoS attacks
wherein a faulty router introduces bogus traffic
claiming that the traffic originates from a legitimate end
host. Yet, none of these protocols explicitly address this

7 ISSUES
7.1 Quality of Service
Real routers implement Quality of Service (QoS)
providing preferential treatment to specified traffic via
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problem. Of course, standard rate-limit scheme can be
applied against these kinds of DoS attacks.

[3]

8 CONCLUSION

[4]

To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
serious attempt to distinguish between a router
dropping packets maliciously and a router dropping
packets due to congestion. Previous work has
approached this issue using a static user-defined
threshold, which is fundamentally limiting. Using the
same framework as our earlier work (which is based on
a static user-defined threshold) [4], we developed a
compromised router detection protocol χ that
dynamically infers, based on measured traffic rates and
buffer sizes, the number of congestive packet losses
that will occur.

[5]

[6]

[7]

K.A. Bradley, S. Cheung, N. Puketza, B. Mukherjee, and
R.A. Olsson, "Detecting Disruptive Routers: A Distributed
Network Monitoring Approach," Proc. IEEE Symp.
Security and Privacy (S&P '98), pp. 115-124, May 1998.
A.T. Mizrak, Y.-C. Cheng, K. Marzullo, and S. Savage,
"Detecting and Isolating Malicious Routers," IEEE
Trans. Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 3, no. 3,
pp. 230-244, July-Sept. 2006.
L. Subramanian, V. Roth, I. Stoica, S. Shenker, and R. Katz,
"Listen and Whisper: Security Mechanisms for BGP," Proc.
First Symp. Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI
'04), Mar. 2004.
S. Kent, C. Lynn, J. Mikkelson, and K. Seo, "Secure Border
Gateway Protocol (Secure-BGP)," IEEE J. Selected Areas in
Comm., vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 582-592, Apr. 2000.
Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D.B. Johnson, "Ariadne: A Secure
On- Demand Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks," Proc.
ACM MobiCom '02, Sept. 2002.

We evaluated the effectiveness of protocol χ
through an implementation and deployment in a small
network. We show that even fine-grained attacks, such
as stopping a host from opening a connection by
discarding the SYN packet, can be detected.
APPENDIX
Similar to the specification that we have defined in [4],
we cast the problem as a failure detector with accuracy
and completeness properties.
• a-Accuracy: A failure detector is a-Accurate if
whenever a correct router suspects (π, τ), then |π|≤
a and some router r  אπ was faulty in π during τ.
We use the term traffic faulty to indicate a router that
drop packets from transit traffic and the term protocol
faulty to indicate a router that behaves arbitrarily with
respect to the detection protocol. The a-Accuracy
requirement can result in a detection if a router is either
protocol faulty or traffic faulty.
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